Saudi Arabia’s pivot to public‑private partnerships for 2034 World Cup stadiums, including Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City, intensifies questions over FIFA’s ability to enforce human‑rights, transparency and labour safeguards on host nations. The emerging PPP model, while attracting foreign investment and expertise, raises new concerns about accountability, workers’ rights, and public scrutiny across the World Cup delivery chain.
Saudi Arabia’s use of public‑private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver key stadiums for the 2034 FIFA World Cup, including the Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City project in Riyadh, is deepening the country’s integration with global capital and construction networks while simultaneously testing international expectations on governance, human rights and transparency in mega‑event hosting.
Saudi Arabia’s PPP Stadium Push
The specialist construction and infrastructure platform MEED reported that Saudi Arabia has made stadiums “the main event” in its construction drive, noting that the kingdom must meet FIFA’s requirements for at least 14 all‑seater venues, including an 80,000‑seat stadium for the opening and final, 60,000‑seat arenas for semi‑finals and 40,000‑seat grounds for all other games. According to MEED, Saudi Arabia’s bid documentation envisages 11 new stadiums, bringing the total portfolio to 15 venues geared towards hosting the expanded 48‑team tournament in 2034.
In August 2025, MEED detailed how several local firms, working in joint ventures with international partners from Spain, Belgium, China and elsewhere, have already secured major stadium contracts as Riyadh reorders spending priorities to focus on event‑driven projects. This shift has increased reliance on PPP structures and foreign expertise, anchoring the World Cup preparations in long‑term commercial arrangements with private operators and investors.
Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City as PPP Flagship
On 18 August 2025, sector outlet Saudi Gulf Projects reported that the Ministry of Sport, in collaboration with the National Center for Privatization & PPP and the Riyadh Region Municipality, launched the Expression of Interest and Request for Qualification phase for the Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City project in Riyadh. According to Saudi Gulf Projects, this PPP will follow a design, build, finance, operate and maintain (DBFOM) model over a 20–30‑year term, and includes a new stadium of about 47,000 seats north of King Abdullah Park in the Al‑Malaz district, alongside a broader master plan for the sports city.
Infrastructure publication Partnerships Bulletin similarly reported that, on 17 August 2025, the Ministry of Sport and the National Centre for Privatisation & PPP issued an EOI and RFQ notice for the Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City scheme, describing it as the first of several stadiums to be delivered on a PPP basis ahead of the 2034 World Cup. Partnerships Bulletin highlighted that the project is intended to host major domestic and international events, including World Cup fixtures, and will be operated under a long‑term PPP contract lasting up to three decades.
International Contractors and Financial Interests
According to MEED, four large stadium schemes have already been awarded, signalling the scale of international engagement in Saudi Arabia’s World Cup build‑out. The platform reported that, in December 2024, the Ministry of Sport awarded a contract to Saudi Binladin Group to redevelop and expand King Fahd Sports City in Riyadh, lifting capacity from 68,752 to 92,000 seats to meet FIFA’s requirements for flagship matches.
MEED further reported that, in January 2024, the Public Investment Fund‑backed Jeddah Central Development Company awarded an estimated SR6.7 billion (around 1.8 billion dollars) contract for a 46,000‑seat Jeddah Central stadium to a joint venture between China Railway Construction Corporation and the local firm Sama Construction for Trading & Contracting, with completion targeted for 2026. In February 2024, MEED noted that Saudi Aramco awarded an approximately SR3.7 billion (about 1 billion dollars) contract to a joint venture of Belgian contractor Besix and Saudi‑based Albawani for a 45,000‑seat stadium in Dammam, forming part of an 800,000‑square‑metre master plan.
The same report described Qiddiya Investment Company’s October 2024 award of a roughly SR3.7 billion contract to a joint venture of Spain’s FCC Construcción and local contractor Nesma & Partners for the 45,000‑seat Prince Mohammed bin Salman Stadium at Qiddiya City, featuring a retractable pitch, roof and LED wall. In a separate corporate statement, Nesma & Partners confirmed signing an agreement with FCC Construcción to submit a joint prequalification for the Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City PPP, describing the future stadium as a FIFA World Cup Round of 32‑compliant venue designed to promote inclusivity, community engagement, commercial sustainability and economic growth.
King Salman Stadium and the 15‑Venue Portfolio
As part of the same portfolio, MEED reported that the flagship King Salman Stadium north of Riyadh, designed by US architectural firm Populous, is expected to host the opening and final of the 2034 tournament, with capacity exceeding 92,000 and construction targeted for completion by 2029 following a tender phase. An overview shared on social media and cited by ArchDaily indicated that Saudi Arabia’s 15‑stadium portfolio involves eight new venues and seven already underway, reflecting the scale and pace of the construction agenda.
MEED also listed other projects in the pipeline, including the New Murabba Stadium, Roshn Stadium, South Riyadh Stadium, Qiddiya Coast Stadium, King Abdullah Economic City Stadium and Neom Stadium, forming a network of venues across the kingdom. The report added that Roshn, a major gigaproject developer, had received revised commercial proposals from contractors for a new 46,000‑seat stadium near National Guard facilities southwest of Riyadh, while procurement had begun on the PPP‑structured expansion of Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City Stadium itself.
Foreign Ownership and Market Liberalisation
In its August 2025 coverage, MEED emphasised that the PPP wave coincides with what it described as a pause or recalibration in broader gigaproject spending, with Riyadh directing resources towards event‑linked developments. This, the outlet reported, has prompted Saudi authorities to become more open about project plans as they seek foreign investment in sectors such as sports, previously restricted to domestic control.
MEED highlighted what it called a “striking development” in July, when authorities announced winning bidders for the rights to own and operate three sports clubs, and noted that the US‑based Harburg Group secured ownership rights to Al‑Kholood Football Club, marking the first time a foreign investor has owned a Saudi football club. Partnerships Bulletin likewise underlined that the same July agreement signalled a landmark shift in Saudi football ownership models at the very moment PPPs are being used to anchor World Cup‑related stadium projects.
Governance and Transparency in PPP Structures
From a global sports‑governance perspective, the heavy reliance on PPPs and foreign contractors introduces multi‑layered governance questions. FIFA’s own bidding and hosting regulations for the World Cup, developed after criticism of past tournaments, call for commitments on human rights, worker protections, non‑discrimination, environmental sustainability and anti‑corruption safeguards across the event delivery chain, including infrastructure and services. Yet PPP arrangements such as the one detailed by Saudi Gulf Projects and Partnerships Bulletin at Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City spread responsibilities across ministries, the National Center for Privatization & PPP, municipal authorities and private consortia, complicating public oversight.
The DBFOM model described in these reports concentrates significant operational power in private partners for up to three decades, raising questions about how transparency in contracting, procurement and operations will be ensured over such timeframes. Anti‑corruption benchmarks, public disclosure of contract terms and clear grievance mechanisms for workers and local communities become critical governance tests if Saudi Arabia is to align World Cup‑related PPPs with international expectations and FIFA’s stated standards.
Labour‑Rights Risks in the Build‑Out
While the reports by MEED, Saudi Gulf Projects and Partnerships Bulletin do not detail labour standards, they collectively document a rapid, capital‑intensive and contractor‑driven build‑out of stadium infrastructure reminiscent of other Gulf mega‑events. Given the region’s broader history of migrant‑labour exploitation and the documented abuses around stadium construction in neighbouring Qatar ahead of the 2022 World Cup, international rights groups have repeatedly warned that any Gulf mega‑event must incorporate robust labour‑rights monitoring, wage protections and safe‑working‑conditions guarantees.
With projects like the Jeddah Central stadium, the Dammam stadium, Qiddiya’s Prince Mohammed bin Salman Stadium and the future King Salman Stadium involving large‑scale construction in tight timeframes, the burden of proof lies with both Saudi authorities and private contractors to demonstrate compliance with international labour norms. Absent explicit transparency on worker‑welfare plans and independent inspections, the PPP model risks distancing FIFA and global spectators from the realities faced by the workers building the very venues that will host the 2034 tournament.
Human Rights, Press Freedom and Stadium Ownership
The coverage by MEED, Saudi Gulf Projects and Partnerships Bulletin paints a picture of significant foreign investment and ownership stakes entering Saudi sport at a moment when human‑rights organisations continue to highlight restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful dissent in the kingdom. While these trade publications focus on contracts and project milestones, international observers are likely to ask whether privately operated World Cup stadiums will be subject to transparent rules on protest, signage, fan expression and media access during the tournament.
Press‑freedom standards are also central to FIFA’s hosting framework, which anticipates unfettered access for journalists, including the ability to report on social and political issues linked to the event. In an environment where stadiums such as Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City and King Salman Stadium are delivered through PPPs and long‑term commercial arrangements, questions arise over who sets and enforces media‑access rules and how those rules interact with both Saudi domestic law and FIFA’s contractual obligations to broadcasters and news organisations.
Sportswashing Concerns and the Role of FIFA
The reports by MEED, Saudi Gulf Projects, Partnerships Bulletin, Nesma & Partners and other corporate communications collectively underline how central the World Cup is becoming to Saudi Arabia’s wider economic and diplomatic strategy, with PPPs and foreign ownership treated as vehicles for deeper global integration. This aligns with broader analyses that describe Riyadh’s pursuit of major events and elite sports partnerships as part of a long‑term soft‑power project, sometimes labelled “sportswashing” by critics who argue that glittering stadiums and foreign investment risk overshadowing ongoing rights concerns.
By allowing PPP‑delivered venues such as Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City and the King Salman Stadium to underpin the 2034 tournament, FIFA and its member associations face mounting pressure to demonstrate that commercial complexity does not dilute accountability. Stakeholders including fans, civil‑society organisations and human‑rights groups are likely to scrutinise whether FIFA’s oversight extends beyond the host government to encompass private concessionaires, construction joint ventures and foreign club owners who now form part of the World Cup ecosystem.
Legitimacy and the Global Sports‑Governance Debate
As documented by outlets such as MEED and Partnerships Bulletin, the Saudi PPP stadium programme embodies a broader transformation in how mega‑events are financed and controlled, with sovereign wealth funds, multinational contractors and foreign investors woven deeply into the hosting model. This trend intensifies wider debates about the legitimacy of global governing bodies like FIFA, which must now regulate not just states but complex public‑private coalitions whose incentives may not align with human‑rights or transparency priorities.
The detail provided in these reports on long‑term PPP arrangements, foreign ownership of clubs and multi‑billion‑dollar stadium contracts offers valuable insight into how the 2034 World Cup is being constructed in financial and institutional terms. For international stakeholders, the core question is whether the emerging PPP architecture in projects like Prince Faisal bin Fahad Sports City reinforces or undermines the accountability framework that FIFA has pledged to uphold, and whether the tournament becomes a test case for confronting—or entrenching—the fusion of authoritarian governance, global capital and high‑profile sport.